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I. INTRODUCTION
Facts and realities that do not fit theoretical models are always a source of puzzlement for economists, and few cases come close to Lebanon in challenging model's of financial crises and debt sustainability. Based on standard models, experience from other countries, and derived rules of thumb, many observes may argue that Lebanon should have undergone a debt crisis a long time ago. Government debt is one of the highest in the world, and the country has been faced with two episodes of severe financial pressures in 2005 and 2006 that were both triggered by exogenous shocks. All things considered, each episode had the ingredients of a perfect storm, yet, Lebanon weathered them, seemingly without much lasting damage. In this paper we attempt to identify the factors that possibly helped Lebanon withstand these shocks.
Lebanon's debt overhang has been built up since the end of the civil war in 1991, initially reflecting the need for reconstruction spending (Figures 1 and 2 ). 1 Rising expenditures (mostly on reconstruction and the integration of militias into the military) that were unmatched by revenue efforts or foreign assistance produced high primary deficits in the early 1990s. The primary adjustment that followed in the second half of the 1990s was insufficient to offset the adverse effects of rising interest expenditure and declining real GDP growth on debt dynamics. By 2001, government debt had risen to 164 percent of GDP, about one third of which was in foreign currency. The mounting fiscal imbalances and attempts at fiscal consolidation contributed to a slowdown in investment and growth, while the government faced severe rollover problems. A program of fiscal adjustment was undertaken in late 2002 (as part of the Paris II reform agenda), and the authorities were able to contain the primary deficit in 2003 and 2004, which, combined with temporary interest relief, brought about an improvement in the overall deficit, stabilizing the debt at just below 170 percent of GDP at end-2004. 1 A detailed account of the reconstruction period is given in Eken and others (1995) and Eken and Helbling (1999) . Lebanon: Real Implicit Interest Rate and Real Growth, 1993-2006 (In percent) Sources: Lebanese authorities; and authors' calculations. 1/ Interest expenditure in t over debt stock in t-1, less the change in the GDP deflator.
Real implicit interest rate 1/ Real GDP growth Confidence started to strengthen again with the appointment of Prime Minister Mikati on April 15 which was perceived as a signal that there would be political agreement and elections without foreign interference. Deposit outflows were recouped, reserves rebuilt, and spreads declined to 246 basis points by year-end. 3 Still, debt ratcheted up further to 179 percent of GDP, in part reflecting the slowdown in growth.
The second serious exogenous shock resulted from the unexpected eruption of the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in July 2006. After a strong growth recovery in the first half of the year, the July-August conflict led to renewed financial market pressures, a near-standstill in economic activity, and fiscal pressures. Spreads jumped by close to 200 basis points to over 400 basis points. Deposit outflows amounted to over $3 billion (5.4 percent of deposits), and deposit dollarization jumped from 72 percent to 75 percent in August. However, central bank gross reserve losses were limited by the deposits from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait with the central bank of $1 billion and $500 million respectively. 4 As in 2005, confidence returned eventually and deposit outflows were more than recouped by year-end, although the domestic political situation remained unsettled. 5 While the direct fiscal costs of the conflict were roughly matched by donor support in 2006, the phasing out of Paris II interest relief and rising transfer to the power utility resulted in an increased overall deficit. Still, because of relatively high inflation (and thus higher nominal GDP growth), the government debt ratio stabilized at 178 percent of GDP.
This paper draws on interviews with market participants in Beirut and London carried out in July 2007. Early warning systems of debt crises would assign to Lebanon a high probability of undergoing a crisis, but no crisis has occurred so far even as the debt burden has continued to grow. To shed some light (and confirm or disprove some of the conventional wisdom about Lebanon's uniqueness), we turned to market participants and inquired about their views of the Lebanese situation and their reasons for investing in Lebanese paper, exploring the factors that have enabled Lebanon to manage the 2005 and 2006 financial tensions. We conducted interviews with six leading banks in Beirut and seven investment banks and hedge funds in London. 6 Commonalities in the answers provided during these interviews reinforced the view that indeed there are identifiable factors that have contributed to relative financial stability in Lebanon.
We find that Lebanon, at present, benefits first and foremost from a perceived implicit guarantee from donors, but also from its reputation in credit markets and a unique investor base. Investors and depositors alike take comfort from the perception that donors have signaled an implicit guarantee not to let Lebanon fall into a financial crisis. They are further comforted by the fact that Lebanon has never defaulted on its external debt obligations in the past. Moreover, investors and depositors tend to be "dedicated," basing their investment decisions largely on bottom-up research and often having personal ties to the country, as in the case of Lebanon's sizable Diaspora. Local banks, which hold the majority of government paper, are an important pillar of stability, since their large exposure to the sovereign creates strong incentives to stay the course, even during times of financial pressures.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines Lebanon's core vulnerabilities, while Section III characterizes the main groups of investors in Lebanese paper. Sections IV identifies factors that contribute to stability in the market for Lebanese debt, and Section V seeks to explain the stability of the Lebanese depositor base. Section VI concludes.
II. LEBANON'S MAIN VULNERABILITIES
The literature on debt and financial crises focuses on willingness and ability to pay. Willingness to pay reflects the relative costs and benefits of default, while ability to pay relates to solvency and liquidity. Empirical studies have identified a range of indicators that proxy willingness, solvency, and liquidity (e.g., International Monetary Fund 2003, and Schimmelpfennig 2003) . Some typical indicators of willingness and solvency are the debt to GDP ratio or the debt to revenue ratio. Liquidity is often measured by rollover or gross financing needs. Such indicators can be used to predict the probability of a debt crisis occurring in the near future, or simply to characterize vulnerabilities. For example, Manasse and Roubini (2005) find that countries with government debt of more than 50 percent of GDP are prone to debt crises. Similarly, the IMF's World Economic Outlook of 2003 shows that the median public debt stood at around 50 percent of GDP in countries that underwent a debt crisis and that sustainable debt to GDP ratios may be as low as 25 percent.
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Despite exceeding such thresholds (and exceeding debt levels observed in similarly rated countries) by wide margins, Lebanon is considered attractive by investors in the class of similarly rated countries. In terms of fundamentals other than fiscal, Lebanon is indeed broadly comparable to these peers (Table 1) . 8, 9 7 More generally, debt crises have occurred at a wide range of debt-to-GDP ratios, illustrating that factors other than solvency are also important (e.g., Finger and Mecagni, 2007 ). An alternative approach to debt sustainability is a forward-looking assessment of whether a country can be expected to stay current on its debt service obligations while also pursuing policy priorities, and whether fiscal policy can respond to shocks. With respect to the latter, applications of Bohn's (1998 and model-based sustainability approach can be found in Mendoza and Ostry (2007) , and Abiad and Ostry (2005) . In addition, probabilistic approaches can be used to assess debt sustainability. Celasun, Debrun, and Ostry (2006) develop a fan-chart approach for a large number of countries. Di Giovanni and Gardner (forthcoming) apply a simplified version to Lebanon. Lebanon's main public debt vulnerabilities arise both from solvency as well as liquidity concerns. Lebanon's debt burden is among the highest in the world in terms of debt to GDP and debt to revenue ratio ( Figures 3 and 4) . Debt service took up 52 percent of revenues in 2006 or 13 percent of GDP ( Figures 5 and 6 ). About half of government debt is denominated in foreign currency. However, only a quarter of government debt at the end of 2006 is estimated to be held by non-residents-a much lower share than in most peers (Figures 7 and 8 ). While public debt is mostly held domestically, the country as a whole has a high external debt to GDP ratio ( Figure 9 ). Domestic banks hold the majority of government paper, playing a larger role than in most peer countries ( Figure 10 ). Banks fund their positions from deposits, which reached 267 percent of GDP in 2006, a large part of which held by non-residents. 10 This is reflected in the relatively low government debt to broad money ratio (Figures 11 and 12) . Individual deposits tend to be highly concentrated ( Figure 13 ), suggesting that high net-worth individuals make up the bulk of deposits. Moreover, deposits have a very short average maturity ( Figure 14) , and deposit dollarization is very high (Figure 15 ). With the average maturity of deposits (less than one month) being much shorter than that of government paper (just over one year for Treasury bills (t-bills) and around six years for Eurobonds as of August 2007), the banking system-and therefore the country-is exposed to a very significant rollover risk. In addition, the high degree of dollarization introduces exchange rate risk borne by the state and private debtors (and transferred to creditors in the form of credit risk). Lebanon's vulnerabilities were tested in the 2005 and 2006 episodes of financial market pressures, but in both instances a full-fledged crisis was avoided. In both episodes, an exogenous shock affected confidence and triggered significant deposit outflows and pressures on reserves. However, pressures were managed, and confidence was restored fairly quickly. Indeed, in late 2005, Eurobond spreads had fallen to historic lows, being even tighter than the EMBI Global ( Figure 16 ). 
III. INVESTORS AND INVESTMENT STRATEGIES
Unsurprisingly, domestic and foreign investors in Lebanese paper have very different investment strategies (Table 2) . Domestic investors do not have many investment alternatives to the sovereign, in particular in domestic currency. For foreign investors, Lebanon is just one of many credits that can be included in a portfolio. However, in their monitoring and assessment of Lebanon, domestic and foreign investors are much alike, with the political situation and gross international reserves being the key factors that are being watched (Table 3) . Most market participants thought that a turn-around in Lebanon's debt dynamics (soft landing) was still feasible, and in particularly foreign investors viewed this as somewhat of a fundamental premise underlying their decision to hold Lebanese paper.
Local banks are often described as captive investors because they have little alternative opportunities. Given very tight net open position regulations, banks look at their Lebanese pound portfolio and their foreign currency portfolio as de facto two separate balance sheets. There is very little demand for private sector credit in Lebanese pounds because of relatively high interest rates, so that almost all deposits are invested in T-bills ( Figure 17 ). One banker compared deposits to shares in a mutual fund which is investing almost exclusively in Tbills. In foreign currency, domestic banks have other investment opportunities, although the demand for private sector credit is lackluster. 11 More recently, major domestic banks have focused on regional expansion to diversify their foreign currency portfolio. Foreign investors can be grouped broadly into three categories. First, investors who follow a benchmark include Lebanon almost automatically in their portfolio in line with that benchmark composition (e.g., the Emerging Market Bond Index, EMBI). Second, some investors consider Lebanon as an attractive credit over the long-term based on thorough bottom-up research and continuous monitoring-for many investors, however, the resource costs of researching Lebanon is considered high relative to the potential return from the portfolio. Third, there are investors who temporarily include Lebanon in their portfolio based on specific trading ideas (e.g., front running expected developments).
For international investors, diversification is one motivation for holding Lebanese papers. In recent years, the correlation between different assets has increased substantially, and Lebanon offers diversification opportunities. With the price of Lebanese paper being largely driven by local idiosyncratic events in the short-run (predominantly political), but still following broadly the market over the medium-term, the correlation of the return on Lebanese paper with other assets is relatively low while the overall volatility of Lebanese spreads is close to that of the market ( Figure 18 and Table 4 ). There were mixed views on the attractiveness of Lebanese paper in terms of yield. Some participants thought that the yield on Lebanese debt was in line with the market given Lebanon's rating, if not somewhat higher (Figures 19 and 20) . Others thought that spreads were not fully reflective of Lebanon's underlying risks, pointing to the lack of activity on the secondary market and the possibility of a scarcity premium as an explanation. 12 For foreign investors, the yield on t-bills denominated in Lebanese pounds was not sufficiently higher than the yield on Eurobonds to justify the exchange rate risk-even if that was considered to be very low-and the resource costs of some technical requirements to invest in the local markets. 
IV. SELF-REINFORCING STABILITY IN THE MARKET FOR LEBANESE DEBT
Two main factors help explain the relative stability of demand for Lebanese sovereign paper. First, despite Lebanon's B-rating, investors view the probability of default as very low, as, e.g., reflected in Lebanon's very narrow Eurobond spreads prior to the 2006 conflict. This is motivated by Lebanon never having defaulted on its obligations, and a perception that international donors are providing an implicit guarantee. Second, because a large share of sovereign debt is held domestically, a default would be very costly in Lebanon which, in turn, creates added incentives for both the government and the main holders of government debt (i.e., the banks) to avoid such an outcome.
Relatively low probability of default
Lebanon has maintained a perfect record of meeting its debt obligations, even during very difficult times. Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) show that a country's history of default impacts the market's risk perception today. As a result, countries who have defaulted in the past have lower debt levels than countries who have a history of never defaulting. The authors call this "debt intolerance," and, using this labeling, Lebanon then seems to exhibit "debt tolerance." There have been no defaults, not even during the civil war, nor during the times of financial pressures in 2005 and 2006. 13 As one market participant noted, in Lebanon, there is not even talk of a default from within the government or the opposition. With a large share of government debt being held domestically, and ultimately by depositors, the costs of default in Lebanon would be very high, thus making the option of defaulting to address the large public debt overhang very unattractive. 14 This "no default" record sets Lebanon apart from many of its peers who have taken recourse to defaulting on several occasions. According to data compiled by Standard and Poor's, countries were, on average, in default on at least one external debt obligation in nine years out of the last 32 years, i.e., in any given year, there is a 28 percent chance that a country might default ( Figure 21 and Table 5 ). In the view of many market participants, the risk of a credit event is further mitigated by what they perceive to be an implicit guarantee from international donors. In analyzing Lebanon as an investment opportunity, market participants singled out the implicit guarantee from donors and international financial institutions (IFIs) as the most important factor (Table 6) , with some referring to Lebanon as a "moral hazard trade." 15 Events in 2006
provide an illustration. On July 25, 11 days after the conflict erupted, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait announced that they would deposit $1 billion and $500 million respectively with the Lebanese central bank, and provide an additional $500 million and $300 million in aid. The impact on confidence was prompt, with CDS spreads narrowing immediately, and Eurobond spreads starting to narrow about one week after the announcement (Figure 22 ). In the minds of market participants, confidence appears to have been further boosted by the August 31 donors' conference in Stockholm that generated pledges of around $900 million. 16 Of course, this implicit guarantee reflects in part geopolitical considerations, which may change in the future. 
Market structure
The domestic banking system (including the central bank) holds around three quarters of government debt and can be considered "captive," having little interest in opting out and triggering a crisis. Local banks hold about 50 percent of outstanding government paper, with equal shares of t-bills in Lebanese pounds and Eurobonds. In addition, the central bank holds another 25 percent of government debt, 80 percent of which in t-bills. Given local banks' large exposure to the sovereign (more than 50 percent of their assets are made up of government and central bank paper), a sovereign debt crisis would immediately turn into a banking crisis. The relatively high concentration in the banking sector also means that this systemic risk is internalized by banks-none of the important banks can afford to abruptly exit the government paper market without consequences for itself. Hence, local banks have strong incentives to continue financing the government as long as they have the necessary liquidity. 17 As a result, trading of Lebanese paper is rather thin, limiting price changes during periods of stress. Moreover, the central bank acts as a lender of last resort to the government, including in foreign currency, when there is insufficient demand in primary auctions.
International investors hold only a small fraction of total Lebanese debt, but also contribute to market stability. Only 26 percent of total government debt is estimated to have been external debt at end-2006 (though around 50 percent of total government debt is denominated in foreign currency), and just a small number of investors hold Lebanese paper in their portfolio given the high cost of doing research relative to the low volume available for trading (Figure 23 ). Absolute return investors which include Lebanon in their portfolio base this decision typically on in-depth research, taking a long-term view (see Table 2 above), and accepting that the market can dry up completely during episodes of stress. Therefore, these investors are less startled by short-term news, and are willing to take time finding a buyer rather than attempting a fire sale in a one-way market, which would lead to huge price volatility and excessive losses. 18 Relative return investors hold Lebanese paper because it is part of the benchmark they are tracking, i.e., they hold Lebanon for technical reasons. Not having Lebanon in their portfolio puts them at risk of underperforming the benchmark index in times when most of the index is trading sideways or down, and Lebanon for its own reasons generates a significant gain. These investors will provide stable demand for Lebanese paper as long as Lebanon is part of their benchmark portfolio. For both investor groups, the fact that Lebanese debt is fairly uncorrelated with the market provides welcome diversification in their portfolio (see above). Of course, the low correlation reflects also the relatively low weight of international investors in this market and the stabilizing role of the domestic banks. Correlation would possibly increase if international investors took on a larger share of the market. The limited availability of Lebanese paper could also result in a scarcity premium, driving down the yield.
17 At the same time, the larger local banks have adopted a strategy of regional expansion to slowly diversify away from the sovereign. However, such a portfolio reallocation will have to proceed very cautiously to avoid a crisis and will have to be matched either by debt reduction or the tapping of alternative sources of financing by the government. 18 Market participants reported that it can take up to a month to find a buyer for a specific paper. If no direct buyer can be found, market makers attempt to design a domino trade that involves several in-between trades. L e b a n o n J a m a i c a P a k i s t a n S e y c h e l l e s U r u g u a y E c u a d o r S e r b i a P h i l i p p i n e s I n d o n e s i a U k r a i n e T u r k e y V e n e z u e l a A r g e n t i n a 
A virtuous circle
In the view of one market participant, the particular investor groups holding Lebanese paper seem willing or feel constrained to stay with Lebanon, even during times of stress, which creates a virtuous circle. 19 Domestic banks have little other choice, relative return investors maintain positions for technical reasons, and dedicated absolute return investors, at a minimum, have patience. 20 All three groups perceive a low probability of default given the implicit guarantee from donors and Lebanon's past performance. Moreover, they stay engaged given the relatively attractive yield on Lebanese paper. And as long as not too many players deviate from the holding strategy, the good equilibrium is preserved. What sets Lebanon apart from other countries the most, is the role of local banks (Figure 24 ). However, ultimately, local banks merely play an intermediation role, and the question then becomes why depositors continue to provide financing to the country. 
V. THE ROLE OF DEPOSITS
The main sources of deposits are the large and wealthy Lebanese Diaspora, Arab investors in the region, and Lebanese residents. 21 The classification of resident and non-resident deposits is essentially based on whether the holder of the deposit lists a Lebanese address. In this classification, residents account for the lion's share of deposits ( Figure 25 ). However, anecdotal evidence from local banks suggests that the Lebanese Diaspora (most of whom have a Lebanese address) is the largest group of depositors. This Diaspora includes a significant share of high net worth individuals, many doing business in countries with underdeveloped banking systems. Depositors from other Arab countries reportedly hail mostly from Syria, West Bank and Gaza, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE. Some banks have indicated that they are seeking to focus more on Lebanese depositors (resident and Diaspora) who are considered to be less volatile in times of crisis. Banks estimate that large depositors hold up to 20 percent of their wealth in Lebanon, including in deposits. Lebanese banks view depositor confidence as being driven by similar factors as investor confidence. Despite Lebanon's vulnerabilities, the risk of a default appears to be judged as relatively low in light of the perceived implicit guarantee by donors, Lebanon's track record of no depositor losses, the maintenance of full (internal and external) convertibility during times of stress, and the banking system's high dollar liquidity. Lebanese banks have been successful in selling these advantages, combined with Lebanon's provisions for bank secrecy, to their regional and Lebanese Diaspora client base. Moreover, Lebanon's track record of successfully overcoming critical periods in the past has given depositors added comfort and may have lowered their risk perception.
According to local bankers, depositor sophistication varies considerably even among high net worth individuals. In general, depositors are perceived to react mainly to one-off events rather than to steady changes in fundamentals. In this way, they appear similar to the dedicated absolute return investors described above, who take a long-term position based on in-depth research. Depositors follow political events closely and seem particularly focused on the stability of the exchange rate peg, the absence of exchange controls, the level of gross international reserves, and the implicit blanket guarantee from donors which is often viewed as the lynchpin of depositor confidence.
As the 2005 and 2006 episodes show, only a relatively small fraction of depositors reacted to the crisis situation. These depositors either converted their funds to U.S. dollars or withdrew them altogether-in part, deposit outflows were directed to foreign branches of Lebanese banks. Deposit dollarization is already high (see Figure 15 above), and has ratcheted up after each spell of financial pressures. The conversion to U.S. dollars is not only the first step to moving deposits outside the country, it is also protection against the specter of a forced exit from the exchange rate peg and a repeat of high inflation experienced during and immediately after the Civil War. (Figure 26 ). In 2006, the Stockholm conference on August 31 (1½ month after the start of the conflict and a few days after its end) appears to have heralded a much more pronounced turn-around in deposits ( Figure 27 ).
Lebanon's banking system is an attractive destination for deposits. The banking system is well-regulated (c.f. Moody's, 2007) , exhibits good financial sector soundness indicators, and good ratings relative to peers ( Figure 28 and Table 7) . 23 Moreover, the Lebanese banking system offers bank secrecy, and depositors have never lost money from bank failures, as the central bank has chosen to deal with troubled institutions largely through mergers. Moody's (2007) sees the main weakness of the Lebanese banking system in its high exposure to the sovereign in light of the fragile political environment, although risks are mitigated by banks' 22 There is some anecdotal evidence that banks actively convinced clients not to move their deposits out of Lebanon. 23 As in other cases, the rating is seen as being constrained by the sovereign rating because of the system's large exposure. Figure 29 ). This liquidity buffer is viewed by Moody's as enabling banks to withstand a confidence crisis that may result in a run on U.S. dollar deposits or other capital outflows from the banking sector, and thus provides assurances to depositors. 24 In a similar fashion, Fitch (2007) classified Lebanon's banking sector as having a "low level of potential vulnerability," despite being in the "low strength" category.
Source: Moody's. A r g e n t i n a B o l i v i a G e o r g i a J o r d a n L e b a n o n V e n e z u e l a U r u g u a y U k r a i n e I n d o n e s i a P a k i s t a n P h i l i p p i n e s T u r k e y U k r a i n e U r u g u a y P h i l i p p i n e s G e o r g i a L e b a n o n V e n e z u e l a B o l i v i a P a k i s t a n A r g e n t i n a I n d o n e s i a T u r k e y J o r d a n 15 G e o r g i a L e b a n o n A r g e n t i n a B o l i v i a P h i l i p p i n e s I n d o n e s i a P a k i s t a n U k r a i n e U r u g u a y V e n e z u e l a J o r d a n T u r k e y 
24 Maintaining large liquid assets abroad is also one explanation for the relatively low profitability of Lebanese banks. Given differences in national regulations, in particular with respect to non-performing assets, cross-country comparisons of financial soundness indicators have to be interpreted with caution. Lebanese banks are known for offering high quality financial services in the region, which banks themselves characterize as "private banking with a regional rapport." Since the civil war, the system was strengthened through consolidation, liquidation of bad banks, and investment in human capital and IT. Capital increases came from outside investors which strengthened the governance structure and business model of family owned banks. Last, but not least, deposits in Lebanon earn an attractive yield at short maturities, in particular for very large local currency deposits (Figure 30 ), though the margin over international rates has narrowed in recent years. Capital account convertibility combined with the peg to the U.S. dollar plays an important role in giving assurances to depositors. However, other regional banking centers (most notably Dubai) have emerged in recent years and will provide strong competition for Lebanon in the future. Finally, there are some specific reasons why Lebanon is attractive to different groups of depositors (Table 8) . For the Diaspora, the decision to hold deposits in Lebanon is often supported by family, real estate and investment ties to the country and the prospects of an eventual return. In some cases, market participants thought this may be complemented by a "patriotic bid" (akin to a "home bias"), by which deposits are intended to support Lebanon. Deposits from non-Lebanese often complement or precede investments in Lebanon, both in real estate and productive capacity; Lebanon remains an attractive destination for (real estate) investment from other Arab countries because of its mix of liberal attitudes and cultural affinity to the region. Moreover, some bankers thought that Lebanon was an attractive destination that offers diversification for high net-worth individuals. And while the policy challenges are very daunting, there is a belief that a soft landing is still possible and that Lebanon can, over time, grow out of its financial problems. All of this keeps investors interested. Local banks play a key role in maintaining stability. On the one side, they hold the bulk of government paper and have no incentive to liquidate their position abruptly even during severe crisis as this would be self-defeating. On the other side, they mobilize strong and continuous deposit inflows from a dedicated client base that provides the necessary net financing for the government and the balance of payments.
Notwithstanding these favorable factors, the current good equilibrium is likely to be only one of many. Underlying Lebanon's resilience to financial shocks is a growing tension between worsening solvency indicators and ample short-term liquidity. This good equilibrium will remain stable as long as a sufficiently large share of investors and depositors believe that the equilibrium's key pillars, including the perceived guarantee by donors, remain intact. Accordingly, the failure of one or more of these pillars could throw the economy off this "good" equilibrium.
While Lebanon is certainly unique in many aspects, it holds interesting lessons for other countries. First and foremost, Lebanon's experience could be interpreted as validating the notion that markets recognize good behavior and are willing to give countries more leeway if they have never defaulted in the past. Second, a strong local banking system that intermediates inflows can be a contributor to market stability in as much as it creates a more stable investor base-this said, stability is ultimately only as good as the stability of deposits. Third, building on special circumstances to cultivate a dedicated investor and depositor base helps insulate to some degree financing flows from general market trends. Having said that, it is unlikely that many countries could, or even should try to, replicate the Lebanese experience. In this sense, the paper points to the limitations of standard models of debt sustainability and financial crises and the need to complement such models with country specific financial and institutional factors to determine resilience to shocks and risks of financial crises.
Appendix I. Design of Survey
We interviewed representatives of six financial institutions in Lebanon and seven financial institutions in London who trade in Lebanese paper and/or research Lebanon currently or have done so in the past. With respect to institutions in Lebanon, we tried to achieve a mix of large banks, smaller banks, and one foreign bank. Participants received the questionnaire a few weeks in advance of the actual interview. Many participants kindly provided us with written responses either prior to or during the interview. The questionnaire then served as a broad outline for the individual interviews. 
